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this citizen skepticism, of course, is promoted by clevei
propaganda-some by simple economic naTvet8-bu t it exists, and powerfully influences government action even
when beleaguered public servants strive valiantly to stem
the tide.
Third, there is a growing recognition of the dangers and
disadvantages af economic interdependence. Thoughtful
persons are asking whether further trade liberalization can
bring worldwide welfare benefits commensurate with the
costs of added ineecurity and instability of economies.
Thoughtful citizens are entitled to ask whether there may
be a theoretical limit to desirable trade liberalization, in
other words the need for some trade barrier at the border to
prevent economic damage from flowing too quickly from
one nation to another, a sort of ';bulkheadw conception.
Perhaps most significant, it becomes increasingly clear that
economic interdependence does in a realistic sense reduce
national sovereignty. This means that issues formerly
religiously reserved for national control, such as interest
rates, monetary supply, government budget policy, unemployment assistance, now become accepted agenda
items for summit and other international meetings. It also
means that a nation has less scope for experimenting with
various models of structuring its economy or society. This is
inevitably a source of frustration for national politicans.
particularly at a time when citizens tend to impdse greater
What are the causes of the crisis of confidence in the international liberal trade system so successfully imresponsibilities on their governments for their material
plemented during the past three decades? I suggest there
well-being and their quality of life. For example, how can
are at least five such causes, many of them quite obvious.
environmental protection or consumer protection policies
First, i t is obvious that the sustained and often apparently
be developed in the context of international competition?
Fourth, there is. I believe, a greater degree of divergence
intractable sluggishness of the world economy in recent
between the economic structures of major participants in
years would place considerable stress on any system of
economic or political organization. Whether this is due to
the GATT trading system than formerly recognized. At a
time when major economic thought in the United
the pricing revolution over oil or more fundamental causes
such as a possible reevaluation of the relationship of the
influencing a reduction in government control
quality of life to material production, is not my subject.
ticipation in the economy, manifested by
"deregulate" segments of the economy such
Clearly the relatively high unemployment coupled with inflationary trends provokes great political pressures, es- , travel, to reduce or restructure taxes. and to
pecially in nations with slim government majorities. These # = ;"user charges" for many types of governmental
circumstances distinguish our current international
Europeans appear to be moving in a contrary d
economic crisis from those of prior decades, such as the {'manifested by the establishment of significant
<$'policy and regional aid, pressure for further n
period of monetary crisis in the late 1960's.
Second, I think we face a growing skepticism about the -$:, tion, and continued toleration of a much higher degree ol
economists' model of liberal trade and comparative advan- 7 government ownership.
tage. The economists themselves have continued to refine '. .. The international trading system assumed by the
the model and have noted the uncertain plausibility of some :;;rules is one primarily of decentralized economic d
of the assumptions. For example, the model may not be ;;:::making sometimes described as "free enterprise."
adequate for policy decisions during a time of declining -::-!long been recognized that socialist and state t
economic activity, or in the face of monopolistic forces, or
can easily evade the purposes of the
in relation to important non-economic goals of particular .4&rules. Yet, until the success of recant decades of
countries. In particular, the vast majority of citizens in our
liberalization brought the degree of interdependence w
trading democracies do not. I believe, accept the macro *%:have today (along with, one must add, great benefits of corn
models which preach a greater good for a greater number. :,;parative advantage and economies of scale), we perha
when these citizens personally witness heartwrenching dis- '.:tdid not realize how difficult it would be to obtain a smo
locations caused by significant loss of employment. Some of P ~ ~ m e s h iofn ~the gears of the diverse economic system
Many perceptive observers feel that we are currently undergoing the greatest challenge to the liberal trade system,
including GATT (The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade), since the formulation of that system in the immediate post World War I1 period. Certainly the signs are
ominous-in the U.S., in Europe, and elsewhere. Little
progress has been made in mare than four years of international trade negotiations; formidable domes tic political
forces are organizing coordinated campaigns for greater
limitation of imported competing products; and national
governments have been taking actions in blatant disregard
of their legal and moral obligations concerning international trade. Where it will end we don't know. Everyone
present can easily conjure up a doomsday scenario, some
relying on analogies of the disastrous policies of the 1920's
and 1930's. But I don't feel such pessimism is warranted yet.
Nevertheless, it behooves us to pay attention to the possible
causes of the current crisis, and it is instructive to
remember that the crisis was predictable and indeed
predicted, so that its arrival should not be astonishing even
though it may be agonizing.
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manifested by Japan, Europe. the United States. and many
deueloping countries. The current rules on subsidies and
countervailing duties, far example, are woefully inadequate to cope with the pressures put upon importing
economies by a myriad of subtle (and sometimes not so subtle) government aids to exports. In a macro sense consumers
in the importing economy may benefit-at least temporarily-but in a micro sense the domestic producer feels
outraged that while playing by the free enterprise rules he
is losing the game to producers not abiding by such rules.

:

The pressures for power centralization and for uniformity that are caused by greater economic interdependence
and trade liberalization are amply demonstrated historically. In the U.S. {a very successful customs union!), we have
seen 200 years of progressive centralization. More recently
in the European Economic Communities, we see similar
tendencies as free trade policies go hand in hand with free
movement of workers and of capital, which lead to the need
for harmonization of monetary policy, product standards
and liabiIity rules, and ultimately to the necessity to coordinate the greatest sovereign hold-out of all-government
- taxation. How can we reconcile these effects of trade
; ' liberalization with notions of sovereignty or economic "fed, * * ; eralism,"-that
is, the desirability to keep decision making
- -.#,.- as decentralized as possible to allow diverse societies to
pursue particular social, religious, or philosophical goals,
and to experiment with economic structures?
'I

.'

:- . '
"

In addition, when some advocate commodity agreements
on a grand scale, or a system of "organized free trade," we
know that the conception of the world trading system envisaged by that nomenclature is hardly that contemplated
by decentralized or enterprise decision making.
Thus in approaches to the rules of world trade-to implement or to reform-there is fundamental disagreement on
the goals. N o nation today is prepared to tie itself
irrevocably to a structure that may require it to abandon its
own conception of world trade or of its own goals for its internal economic structure.
Clearly then, we can see in this fourth reason for the
current crisis some constraints on possible solutions, a s well
as defects in the current system. The issue of "government
sfra~tured"versus " p ~ i c emechanism or free enterprise"
methods of organizing world trade will not and cannot be
decided in the near or perhaps even intermediate future of
the next several decades. What is necessary is compromise
tion. We do not at pret brings me to my next

'
I

The GATT has a flimsy conatitutional basis, originating in
an agreement never intended to become the central1
organizing mechanism for world trade. Partly as a conequence d this the GATT has never been "definitively
applied," and many of its rules are subject to "prim
national legislation" the so-called grandfather righb which
have engendered acrimony. Partly because of its ambiguous
legal basis, the GATT has not developed a staff and
secretariat able to cope with the extraordinary complexity
of world trade and to provide substantial leadership for
trade policy. The amending process of GATT is eumbersome and some say impossible, so there is a tendency to go
outside the GATT structure to conclude ad hoc "side
agreements" and as these aggqegate, the structure becomes
more complex and inconsistent, harder to change and only
ambiguously subject to some o h h e GATT procedural rules
such aq dispute settlement or waivers. In addition, the
voting structure is blunt and subject to abuse, and the principal other technique of postive initiative - massive
negotiating~"rounds"-may be wheezing its last important
gasp in the frighteningly cumbersome Geneva negotiation
known as the Tokyo Round. I could go on, But I won't here; I
can refer you to othkr statements on this subjects.
Because of these institutional weaknesses, the GATT
which has been called flexible, is actually very rigid. Its
flexibility lies in the ease with which parties can evade its
rules. Because of the rigidity, it has been impossible to keep
the trade rules up to date, and in the face of fast-changing
international developments we find that almost every rule
of GATT is inadequate to the present problems of world
trade, Often this is because of gaps in the rules permitting
evasion of their intent, e.g., import deposit schemes,
variable levies, government assistance to exports not clearly a "subsidy," export "inflation insurance," "surveillance"
techniques of inhibiting imports, and on and on. Other rules
are inadequate because they are wrong or have become
wrong in theory, i.e., they permit what policy makers agree
is less desirable, such as import quotas for balance of
payments reasons, while prohibiting a preferable response,
such as tariff surcharges. The result has been flagrant violation of the rules tolerated by the GATT community.
Once some rule breaches are tolerated then
it becomes easier to get away with
the next infraction, so we see minimum
import price protectionikt systems,
specific mixing requirements, arbitrary
valuation systems, and so on, to
say nothing of the ubiquitous
orderly marketing agreements
sometimes called "voluntary."
Furthermore, there is a
large category of practices
that have barely a
colorable argument of I
justification
under the GATT.
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justificp tion.
Negotiation might be a se$isfiafacto~yway to pussue rule
changes, but the habit 8f wattfog for m j m rtrade negotiation
roeods :a&ssf sort af ''lmopksopors haggle-''where reciprocity
f&p*teveiy cdbruutry to resenre i b 'qbmgaining chlips" far
.,\he. '',%tg p ~ ~ k q pto" e negz~tiated,a smt o+ not.toa;Sb&%e *me d monopoly, has stymied even modest
progpps.an even ralative1y e b p l e issines for years, We caw
sot talimate a sptern whiab inliibirfs rub cham= more
abtan than ance eveoy twelve years. Indeed, it is yet to be
praven that .the t ~ a d eround negotietions wn satisfactorily
mn~1:ludenew rube&a n nofi-tariff-barriers, especially under
archaic and (inappropriate) notions of reciS)Focity and
most-favored nation tree tment.
Even if a rule were clear and up to date, howeyer, it is
dsubtfu! that absent good faith of at least all major trading
oountries the rule could prevent inappropriete conduct in
the face orf the extraordinarily ambiguous GATT
praciedura forr handling disputes and kansgressions. And
today we do riot have good faith in the participants. Nations
' a r e acting shamelsssly and hudulently as some would say
governments,are always prone to db. The tragedy is that a
defective rule ~ysteintends to punish those who abide and
rewerd the transgressor. This encourages evasion and
further erosion of the rules.
This is not to say no rulle transpssion can be tolerated;
- . ng legal system cig~
survive under such a strict criterion. But
when the level and frequency of the transgressions reaches
a esrtain point, the rules and perhaps the whole rule system
eeases to be an effective tool .for government policy.
.Citizens or nations can then no longer depend on abiding
non-transgressing condrict of others, so they must take
defensive action: either carry their own pistols, or build
walls around their house or nation.

*

!

Became of rfrie sftiation, nationsr do not trust each other.

We have the chicken war, [he cheese war, the wine war,
and other gastronomic delights. We have in effect a set of
sartorial wars also involving shoes and textiles. And with
steel, TV's, and automobiles we manage to make the game
interesting as well as vital. Europe worries that its fundamental agriculture policy will b e challenged and
parsnoicaly resists any negotiation on the subject. The U.S.
worries that its steel and television industries will drift
offshore under the onslaught of foreign governments bound
to export their unemployment problems. And so it goes.
The lack of confidence of govermments has a broader and
more pernicious eftect than the promotion of more intergovernmental consultations at culinary capitals of the
world. The private businessman, watching these contests
unfold, and noting that the rules no longer mean what they
say, realizes that he cannot base his business and investment decisions on the assumption that nations will follow
the rules. As the recent GATT study so poignantly illustrated, "such uncertainty is inhibitin investment at a
time when additional investment is crucia . . . .'"
Thus, the crisis feeds on itself, and the vicious circle expands.

t:
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Defects ofthesystem

Before I turn to some of the needs and defects of the institutional system in particular which demand improvement, I would like to say a word about the techniques of
conducting international policy. It seems to me that
diplomatic techniques can be roughly categorized into two
groups: 1) the technique we can call "power oriented," and
2) the technique which we might call "rule oriented."
Power oriented techniques suggest a diplomat asserting,
subtly or otherwise, the power of the nation he represents.
In general, such a diplomat prefers negotiation as a method
of seltling matters, because he can bring to bear the power
of his nation to win advantage in particular negotiations,
whether the power be manifested as promised aid, movement of an aircraft carrier, trade concessions, exchange
rate changes, or the like. Needless to say, often large wuntries tend to favor this technique more than do small countries; the later being more inclined to institutionalized or
"rule oriented" structures of international activity.
A rule-oriented approach, by way of contrast, would
suggest that a rule'be formulated which makes broad policy
sense for the benefit of the world and the parties concerned, and then there be an attempt to develop institutions to
insure the highest possible degree of adherence to that rule.

In the case of disputes between countries, a power
oriented approach is often utilized in the negotiation, so
that the dispute, even if it involves a breach of a rule, may
be settled more from the point of view of who has the effeec- tive power, economic or otherwise, than from the point c#$~-!$
view of determining whether a rule has been breached. A
rule-oriented approach, on the other hand, would also i w :
volva negotiation for a settlement, but in such a negotiat'
the negotiators would be more inclined to resolve the
pute by reference to what they would anticipate an
national body would c~ncludeabout the actio
transgressor in relation to its international obligati

P

di~plomacy.and indeed all government, involves a mixture
of these techniques. To a large degree, the history of
civilization may be described as a gradual evolution from a
power-oriented approach, in the state of nature, toward a
rule-oriented approach. However, never is the extreme in
either case reached. In modern western democracies, a s we
know them, power continues to play a major role, particularly political power of voter acceptance, but also to a
lesser degree economic power such as labor unions or large
corporations. However, these governments have passed far
along the scale toward a rule-oriented approach. and
generally have an elaborate legal system involving court
procedures and a monopoly of force through its police and
military, to insure the rules will be followed. The U.S.
government h ~ l sindeed proceeded far in this direction, as
the resignation of a recent president demonstrates. When
one looks at the history of England over the last thousand
years, I think that the evolutionary hypothesis from power
to rule can be supported. More recently when one looks at
the evolution of the European Economic Community, one is
struck by the evolution toward a system that is remarkably
elaborate in its rule structure, effectuated through a Court
af justice. albeit without a monopoly of force.
,In international affairs, I think a strong argument can be
made that to a certain extent this same evolution must occur, even though currently it has not regressed very far.
The initiatives of the World War I1 anfimmediate postwar
period towards developing international institutions is part
of this evoIution, but as is true in most evolutions there have
been setbacks. and mistakes have been made. Likewise,
when one focuses on international economic policy, we find
also that the dichotomy between power-oriented diplomacy
and rule-oriented diplomacy can be seen. We have tried tm
develop rules, in the context of the International Monetary
Fund and the GATT. The success has been varied. Considerable achievement has occurred in these systems, and
in the IMF the rule system has gone through an elaborate
restructuring, partly as a result of major rule infractions. In
the GATT,too, restructuring is necessary, but the institution
of the GATT itself does not as well lend itself to this restructuring.
Nevertheless, I think a particularly strong argument exists far pursuing even-handedly and with a fixed direction
the progress of international economic affairs towards a
ruIe-oriented approach. Apart from the advantages which
accrue generally to international affairs through a ruleoriented approach, including less reliance an raw power
arid the temptation to exercise it or flex one's muscles
.which cam get out of hand, a fairer break far the smaller
countries ar at least a perception of greater fairness, and
the develapment of agreed procedures to achieve the
necessary compromises, in economic affairs there are additional' reasons.

-

ifsirs tend (at least in peacetime) to affect
irectly than may be the case for political and
fnil'itar-y .yaffairs..,Partiqularl~yas the world becomes more
ecanamlcalFy in'terdegondent, more and more private
dilizbn? find their labs, their businesses, and their quality of
iife affected ilf riot controlled by forces from outside their
~Boundaries.Thus they are more affected by the
'policy +pursuedby their own country on their
Ihl additian, the relationships became increasingly
+tu: the point of being incomprehensible to even
riIIiarrt .hiimin' mind. As a result, citizens assert
esi at least within a democracy, and require their
eptativesagd govefnrnent officials to respond to their
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needs and their pe~ceivedeomplain,tr. The arsault of a9120.
increasing citizen participation, and more parlisnasntarytor
congressional participation im'khaprmemeg of i u m a t i a ~ ~ l
economic poll
thus restricting the & p e e or?Lawsr an#
discretion w h i x the Executive possssscas. This maker inter*,
national negotiations and bargaining iyrearingjly difficult.
In the United States, this process ha8 r#a~keda high p d n t
in the Trade Act of 1914, which is B ~ B with
B ~uarietflaa of
procedures invulving public heeringa, opportunity far
public citizens to complain, congrlssdonal and ,carnu1tations
of various kinds, and explicit authorization %I. citizene to
challenge in court the decisions of the executive officere
responsible for carrying out international emnomie policy.
As a consequence, many aspects of United States international econpmic policy are greatly misunderstood oateide
its borders. When viewed in the context of the American
comti,tutional crisis centering on Watergate, and influenced
,by the Vietnam War, it is hard to argue abstractly that the
congressional assertion of participation rights is imppropriatd.
'

However, if citizensare $oing to make their demands be
heard and had& their influence, a "power-oriented"
negotiating process (often requiring secrecy and exemtive
discretion so as to be able to formulate and irn Isdent the
necessary compromises) become,~more difficuf't! if not tmpossible. Consequently, the only apropriata way to turn
seems to be towards a rule-oriented system, whereby the
various layers of citizens, parliaments, executives, and international organizations will all hlave their inputs, arriving
tortuously to a rule, which, however, when established will
enable business and other decentralized decision makers to
rely upon the stability and predictability of governmental
activity in relation to the rule.

Improvements
Thus, I have outlined the premises that lead me, and a
number of individuals with whom I have consulted, to view
the question of tnatitutional improvement and evolution as
perhaps the most important aspect today of our current international economic problems. It was premises such as
these that led to the formation by the American Society of
International Law of a panel to study them institutional.
subjects, and the result of such panel's work, as you
probably know, is a report published about a year ago.
If what I say is true, why is it that there has been so little
official attention ta these problems? What possibility is
there for same improvement? Let me turn first to the
problem of rple formation.
Some of the suspicions that I mentioned earlier, particularly rho= about the desire of governments to maintain
enough freedom or "sovereignty" to deal with the burdens
of the responsibilities their citizens impose on them, lead
governments to be very cautious in further t in8 their hands
through international bodies. This is norma ,and it suggests
that any further development of international procedures
for rule formulation will be timid and will probably depend
upon a consensub technique invoIving primarily negdtiation. Indeed, one can state that the international trade
negotiating process should be an o n s i d g permanent
feature of the system, and not one of p e f i ~ d i cup and down
"trade rounds."

i'
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In addition, there are lome very real particular fears and
yomiey sbout further reform. Euro e, for example, is
warriled t i b ~ the
~ t cohesion and viabifity of the European
) &mnornio Gommnnity. European leadere understandably
fed that their first attention must b,e to solidify and make
firm the wal gains that have occurred through the evolution
of the European Economic Community. They worry that
acceptance of international constraints may impose too
pest a atrain on the d e l i c te
~ EEC process at least in the pre. 8 ~ noircumdtanees,
t
'

The developing countries, on the other hand, hsve
another set of fears. They enjoy their current majority
status in many organizations, when voting proceeds on a
one-natdon, one-vote system. They consequently fear any
ekange in voting procedures that might turn, from that
system. Unfortunately, there is virtually no chance of
significant rule-making authority developing in any international body today which bases its procedures on the onenation, one-vote system; the major powerful countries
simply will not delegate to such a body any meaningful
authority. Consequently, wnsensus negotiation will undoubtedly continue to be the pririnary mode of rule development, ironically giving even greater weight to the powerful
countries.
Another aspect must be stated frankly: I believe it is fair
to say that the European Economic Community eepresentatives have presented some of the more difficult obstacles
to the potentiality of reform or evolution of the GATT institutional system,-I am not entirely sure what the reasons
for that are, although I have alluded to one above. I can't
help feeling, however, and the feeling exists elsewhere in
the United States, that one of the reasons that the
Europeans enjoy the status quo in GATT so much is that
they have effective control of GATT, particularly in the
voting process. When those nations who belong to the EEC
are combined with the nations associated with EEC in one
sort of preferential arraqgement or another, the total exceeds the two-thirds vote' of GATT required for a waiver,
and exceeds the majority which could influence decisively
most potential issues that might come to a vote in GATT.
One result of this has been an understandable reluctance
on the part of diplomats' from elsewhere in the world, including the United States, to push issues in the GATT context. In short, the United States (as the Congress has explicitly stated in some of its reports) does not trust the
GATT voting process nor the related GATT dispute settlement process.

'
0

With respect to rule formulation, therefore, I think the
obstacles to reform, at least in the short term, 'are probably
decisive, so that I would not anticipate much progress over
the next few years (although I think there will develop a
series of ad hoc and varied rule-making grocedures in connection with particular nontariff barrier codes). With
respect to dispute settlement or rule application
procedures, however, I do think there is an opportunity for
considerable progress. There are many hurdles being put in
the way of reform of the dispu te-se ttlement system-again
EEC representatiyes have been reluctant, developing countries have other interests such as seeking legitimation of
"~pecialand differential treatment" in the GATT negotiation, and the recent DISC dispute settlement case in GATT
may have set back some of the inclination to revise dispute
settlement procedures. Furthermore, with so many pressing
substantive issues that are more readily understood by
political interests back home, governments tend to
downplay the importance of (the more remotely related
procedural questions such as dispute settlement, N n

government wafits to "pay" for dispute settlement reform
under the "reciprocity" rules of G A I T negotiations and
therefore no government wants to seem to be pushing too
hard for dispute setikement which could suggest to other
gwenunents that they can obtain an advantage in another
sector or on another point in exchange for the reform. Finally, the institutional and bureaucratic problems of trying to
advocate longer range solutions in the face of the daily
grind, as well as the lack of legal training and sophistication
of many of the participants in the negotiation, also play a
role. I have been surprised for instance about the misconceptions as to how a legal system or rule-oriented
process operates. There seems to be a feeling that it is "all
or nothing." that a rule system will always completely bind
national official hands, and that the rule is rigid and unremitting in the face of changing circumstances and the
need for particular exceptions. Any jurist or legal scholar
knows better; but many others do not.
Nevertheless, even now, there is considerable attention
to dispute settlement in GATT negotiations, but unfortunately fra mented in connection with different subjects
and draft cofes. The negotiators realize that the rules which
they are negotiating have no meaning except in the context
of some broader 'egal system which involves procedures for
applying rules to concrete facts and resolving disputes
among nations about them. The danger now, as I see it, is
that we will have a fragmented system which will greatly
inhibit the possibility of developing a rule system which
will be understood by the citizens ofjthe world, and which
possesses the potential for growth in prestige so that as time
goes on nations will be willing to put more and more within
the jurisdiction of such a system.

Where should we go? There are many ideas, but let me
present two for your consideration and thoughtful criticism.
First, with respect to dispute settlement. In my view, an
improyed dispute-settlement system in the context of
GATT, or more broadly in the trading system, should posses
the following characteristics, some of which are explained
in the ASIL report:
The procedure should be capable of starting modestly,
but growing in importance as time goes on.
The procedure should depend in its initial steps ton
private consultation, followed by the possibility of conciliation utilizing trained mediators supplied by a
secretariat.
The procedure should depend heavily on a trusted third
party panel-type adjudication of the issues of law and
fact, addressed solely, however, to the question
whether an agreed rule or norm has been violated.
Muddy concepts of "nullification and 'impairment'
should be avoided. Representatives . of the disputant
should not be members of this panel.

d

The process should avoid imposing too great a burden on
this third-party panel, and thus should leave politically
surcharged auestions such as "recommendations" o r

A'] adjudications should result in a reasoned opinian
which will always be published. Oaly in this way e r n
the opinions be subjected to infarmed criticism, only
in this way can the opinions have influenm on the

world, and only in this way can a body of "jurisprudence" develop for future guidance of the
world community.

t%ng countries to governmental tax
exporting countries to its exparting inplex m d even emotional, so that 2
m a q yews before even simple
u l *international subaidy and
d be ill advised unlew there
eaumterr~aiwduty
were ih i f m i ~ w
aBt

The pracedure should be capable of being understad by
the public end ita intelplty and impartiality mu& be
nurtured sa that public and plitieal a~:aptaMQaf it
will increase eb time p e s on.
L.

One possibility for achieving this would be to negotiate
concurrently with the negotiation. now going on. P sqmriate
but connected "'Dispute Settlement P~otocol"which woulld
set forth the procedures and which irrould have two annaxes. Annex A would list ell the rules to whl* &e dis ute:
settlement procedure could a ply: other issuits waultr r e
main under GATP procedure. luch annex might includs the
entirety of scrme particular non-tariff barrier e d e , ar it
might only include portions d agreements, such as some lout
not 821 ~f the Articles af GATT. This would heeve ts the
negotiators the question as to which rules they fsaY sufficiently comfortable about to entrust to such body. I
suspect, far instance, &at the Burapean &on~lnic Cerr~
munity wmId want to omit from such a process, Article X N
of GA?T'. Such e list. however. would be o en ended-that
is, it cauld be added to from time to time.
list would mat.
include custamary international law norms. Only cowentional norms dealing with economic matters would be included.
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Annex El would include the list of countries which were
willing to submit: tbemselvee in advance to the disputesettrement process, with respect to the rules oil Annex A. It
would be permissible for a government to specify excep
tions ta its submittal, i.e.,to specify that it would not submit
under the dispute-mttlemarmt procedure with respect to
specific rules which were nevertheless listed on Annex A.
Hawewer, countries would have to face the fact that these
exceptions are negotiable. The United States and the Eurapaan Ecsnoimic Community, for example, mi ht conclude
an agreement concerning the dabration o the escape
clause'. system of UIT. However, ~ n 9of those gasties
might feek that such an agreement wauld be useless nnlerra
adequate dispute settlemaat procedures apply, and
therefore would refuse ts accept the agreement with
respect to the other nation n ~ l e both
s ~ parties agreed that
the dispute settlement prratocol would include this agreement in Annex A and wbu~dinot be excepted from applfmEion la either pai~rtyin Annex B. To a certaitl extent the
procedu~c;bears same analogy to h e tariff-negotiathg
precess, where each country has its "zcche@ulevof tariff
eoneemionsi Here, It has its "mini schedule" of dispute
settlement commitments. The gradual evolution towards
water dependence oa the dispte-settlern~ntsystem can
occur as g~e,a
ter confidence in fhat system ie achieved.

f

orm or rule farmation, 1 think
erld, as I hawe $rated above, is
nt contributions with resped to
vidua1.cudes in GATT will urn
and praedutea within them for
ao other rewon than it will Bs imhe moat difficult prtrblems of now
time period contemplated for the
kt, tho pracew of appropriate

Apart from the specifics of institutional reforms,
however, it seems clear that the institutions of the international trading system today are crumbling; their
problems are exacerbating the current economic difficulties, and these problems are getting worse. Failure to
give some attention to these institutional questions during
the current trade negotiations will likely nullify the results
of that negotiation in a very short time after it is completed.
The rules being negotiated are only worthwhile if there is
adequate conformity to them, and there is little in the existing institutional system of the trading system to suggest
that adequate conformity is likely to occur, particularly in a
time of stress, a time of divergent economic philosophy, and
in the face of need for experimental but uneasy compromises.
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